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THE SUNDAY TIMES CASE: FREEDOM
OF THE PRESS AND CONTEMPT OF
COURT UNDER ENGLISH LAW AND THE
EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS
CONVENTION
By NATHANIEL L. NATHANSON*
On April 26, 1979, the European Court of Human Rights
decided The Sunday Times case.1 That decision has served to
dramatize the gradual development of a European convention
law of human rights somewhat comparable to our Constitu-
tion's Bill of Rights. The case also illustrates the gulf between
our constitutional law of freedom of the press and contempt
of court, and the British common law on the same subject.
The extent to which the growth of this European convention
law will tend to ameliorate the differences between the Eng-
lish and American law can hardly be foretold from a single
decision, especially when that decision is rendered by a court
as closely divided as was the European Court in this particu-
lar instance. The vote of the court was eleven to nine, with
three members of the majority writing separate opinions. Nev-
ertheless, a close examination of those opinions, against the
background of the common law applied by the English courts,
may provide some insight into the potentialities of a conven-
tion law of human rights for the European community.
I. PROCEEDINGS IN THE ENGLISH COURTS
The Sunday Times case, popularly known as the
* Emeritus Vose Professor of Law, Northwestern University; Distinguished Vis-
iting Professor of Law, University of San Diego, 1977-1980. Yale B.A., 1929, LL.B.,
1932; Harvard S.J.D., 1933.
Presently the judgment of the court is officially reported only in pamphlet form
published by the Council of Europe, Strasbourg, April 26, 1979 [hereinafter cited as
The Sunday Times case]. It is also reported in 18 INT'L LEGAL MATEMrALs 931 (1979),
but this report does not include the dissenting opinion or specially concurring opin-
ions. This article includes parallel citations where possible.
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"thalidomide case," began in the English courts with an appli-
cation by the Attorney-General for an injunction restraining
the publication of an article strongly critical of Distillers Com-
pany (Biochemicals) Ltd.,2 the manufacturer and distributor
of the drug thalidomide in the United Kingdom. The article
alleged that Distillers had been niggardly in the settlements
offered to deformed children of mothers who had taken
thalidomide during their pregnancy. The injunction was
granted by the Divisional Court of the Queen's Bench on the
grounds that the article was intended to influence the settle-
ment of pending litigation and that the article's publication
would jeopardize Distillers' freedom of action with respect to
the litigation.3 The opinion made it clear, however, that the
conclusion was not based on a finding that the article was in-
accurate or even superficial. Rather, the opinion noted: "The
Attorney-General has not suggested that the observations
contained in the article are false in fact, and, accordingly, it
seems to us that for the purposes of this application we ought
to approach the article on the footing that its allegations are
true."4 The article, in effect, charged Distillers "with neglect
in regard to their failure to test the product, or their failure to
react sufficiently sharply to warning signs obtained from tests
by others."' 5 The fact that the charges were apparently sup-
ported by elaborate research may have helped to sustain the
application of the principle regarded as controlling by the
court, namely:
[I]f a party is subjected to pressure by reason of unilateral
comment on his case, and that pressure is of a kind which
raises serious prospect that he will be denied justice because
2 Attorney-General v. Times Newspapers Ltd., [1972] 3 All E.R. 1136 (Q.B.).
3 Id. As the divisional court put it:
[tihis appears to us as a very simple case in which the newspaper is deliber-
ately seeking to influence the settlement of pending proceedings by bring-
ing pressure to bear on one party. Not only is the interference intended,
but, having regard to public opinion, we have no hesitation in saying that
publication of the article complained of would create a serious risk of inter-
ference with Distillers' freedom of action in the litigation.
Id.
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his freedom of action in the case will be affected, then a con-
tempt of court has been established and may be the subject
of prosecution or injunction.6
Finally, it should be noted that the divisional court took
account of what it called the main argument of counsel for
The Sunday Times, who urged the court to balance the pub-
lic's interest in protecting the orderly administration of justice
against its interest in being informed on the grave and
weighty issues of the day.7 This argument was rejected be-
cause the "balancing of competing public interests is an ad-
ministrative rather than a judicial function"8 and because the
court could not "see a public interest in immediate disclosure
which could possibly outweigh the public interest in prevent-
ing the application of pressure to the parties to pending
litigation."
The English Court of Appeal reversed, with a series of
opinions so different in tone from those of the divisional court
that it was difficult to believe the decisions concerned the
same controversy.10 This variance between the courts may be
due to the full-dress debate in the House of Commons on the
"thalidomide children" which occurred subsequent to the de-
cision by the divisional court. All three of the court of appeal
judges, Lord Denning, Lord Phillimore, and Lord Scarman,
seemed considerably troubled by the air of unreality envelop-
ing an injunction designed to prevent newspaper comment on
a subject which had been elaborately discussed in parli-
mentary debates, especially since the debates had in turn
been fully reported in the press. This was not, however, the
6 Id. at 1142.
7 The court summarized the argument in favor of a balancing test as follows:
In cases like the present there are really two competing public interests: one
the protection of the administration of justice and another the right of the
public to be informed on the grave and weighty issues of the day, and...
that ... the publication should not be punished or restrained if, on bal-
ance, the latter interest is the more important, in the circumstances of the
particular case.
Id. at 1145.
a Id.
9 Id.
10 Attorney-General v. Times Newspaper Ltd., [1973] 1 All E.R. 815 (C.A.).
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sole ground of decision in any of the three opinions. The lead
opinion by Lord Denning emphasized the facts which in his
judgment made this case practically unique:
Nearly twelve years ago an overwhelming tragedy befell
hundreds of families in this country. Mothers when preg-
nant had taken thalidomide as a sedative to help them rest.
All believed it was safe. The manufacturers had proclaimed
it to be so. The doctors had accepted their assurances. But
unknown to anyone, if a pregnant woman took it between
the fourth and twelfth weeks it would affect the limbs of the
foetus in the womb. In consequence some 451 babies were
born deformed. Some without arms or legs. Others with
gross distortions."'
But the magnitude of the tragedy was not the only pecul-
iar circumstance of the case. Another element emphasized by
Lord Denning was the dormant character of the judicial pro-
ceedings and the court's ignorance of the status of the negoti-
ations. Sixty-two actions for damages were initiated within
the three year period allowed by the statute of limitations and
were settled in 1968 by a total payment of £1,000,000. Over
the next several years, 266 plaintiffs received permission to
file writs out of time. Another 123 of the known injured
brought no proceedings at all, making a total of 389 persons
not provided for in the settlement. Nevertheless, Distillers an-
nounced publicly that it would provide a substantial sum for
the benefit of all other children not involved in the formal set-
tlement. Later Distillers said it was planning to establish a
charitable trust of £3,250,000 for the benfit of all the mal-
formed children. So far as the court knew, nothing had been
done to carry out the pledge because five of the parents would
not accept the proposal as full settlement of their claims.1"
u Id. at 818.
12 One of the majority had even brought proceedings against the recalcitrant five
to have the parents removed as the next friends of their children and replaced by the
Official Solicitor, who it was believed, would agree to the settlement. This action
failed as reported in In re Taylor's Application, [1972] 2 Q.B. 369. See H. TEFF & C.
MUNRO, THALIDOMIDE - THE LEGAL AFTERMATH (1976) for a fascinating account of
many aspects of the thalidomide controversy which are not relevant to this particular
discussion, including details of the negotiations, issues of tort liability, and problems
of the regulatory system.
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Consequently, the court regarded the negotiations as
quiescent.
13
It was this dormancy aspect that Lord Denning regarded
as particularly important in reaching his decision.
[It is] undoubted law that, when litigation is pending and
actively in suit before the court, no one shall comment on it
in such a way that there is a real and substantial danger of
prejudice to the trial of the action, as for instance by influ-
encing the judge, the jurors, or the witnesses, or even by
prejudicing mankind against a party to the cause.
14
Because these negotiations were at a standstill, the general
rule of "no comment" on active litigation was viewed as
inapplicable.
The litigation's dormant status was not the only concern
Lord Denning regarded as controlling. Another was that "the
interest of the public in matters of national concern, and the
freedom of the press to make fair comment on such matters"
was to be balanced against "the interest of the parties in a fair
trial or a fair settlement of the case." 15 Thus Lord Denning
embraced the very balancing act that the divisional court had
eschewed as inappropriate to the judicial role. Applying this
approach to the particular circumstances of the case, Lord
Denning noted that the public's interest in fair comment ap-
plied to all 451 of the thalidomide children, of which only 266
were involved in pending proceedings. In short, the public's
interest in the entire problem of the thalidomide children out-
weighed the parties' interest in a trial or settlement of the
pending cases insulated from the influence of public opinion.
Lords Phillimore and Scarman espoused substantially the
same grounds as Lord Denning. Lord Phillimore was espe-
13 In the words of Lord Denning.
So far as the Courts are concerned, these 266 actions have gone soundly to
sleep and have been asleep for these three or four years. No one has awak-
ened them .... So the litigation remained dormant .... So far as we
know, it was still dormant when "The Sunday Times" started in September
1972 publishing its articles on the thalidomide children. It is still dormant
today.
Attorney-General v. Times Newspaper Ltd., [1973] 1 All E.R. at 821 (C.A.).
1 Id.
15 Id. at 822.
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cially disturbed that the Attorney-General rather than Distill-
ers applied for the injunction. He thought that the Attorney-
General's action, generally inappropriate where civil proceed-
ings were concerned, was all the more inappropriate in this
particular case because there was no affidavit from any of the
parties dealing with the facts. As a result the court was gener-
ally in the dark regarding the actual status of the negotiations
and the likely effect of publication of the article.'" Lord Philli-
more also had "no doubt that all this so-called litigation is
somewhat unreal .... In a sense we are dealing with some-
thing akin to shadow boxing dressed up as litigation.' 17 Lord
Scarman stated that "these writs are only a minor feature in a
situation which deeply disturbs the nation, and in which the
public has had a very great interest in freedom of discus-
sion.""' He added that "even if I thought the Divisional Court
to have come to a correct decision on 17th November, the
state of public discussion following the Commons debate is
such that I would have thought it right to discharge the in-
junction in the exercise of the court's discretion."19
Despite this unanimity in the English Court of Appeal,
the House of Lords unanimously reversed that court and rein-
stated the injunction of the divisional court, with certain sig-
nificant qualifications.20 It is important to note that the ma-
jority of the participating Law Lords did not wholly adopt the
view of the law taken by the divisional court or by the Attor-
ney-General in his final argument. Thus it might be said that
the law of contempt and freedom of the press as laid down by
the House of Lords was somewhere in between the law as ac-
cepted by the divisional court and the law suggested by the
court of appeal.
This careful compromise was well brought out in the lead
opinion of Lord Reid. Lord Reid first disassociated himself, as
did all the other Law Lords, from the court of appeal's criti-
cism of the Attorney-General for having brought the con-
:6 Id. at 824.
7' Id. at 825.
i Id. at 827.
9 Id. at 828.
20 Attorney-General v. Times Newspapers Ltd., [19731 3 All E.R. 54 (H.L.).
[Vol. 68
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tempt proceedings, instead of leaving such action to the pri-
vate parties concerned. He stated:
So, if the party aggrieved failed to take action either because
of expense or because he thought it better not to do so, very
serious contempt might escape punishment if the Attorney-
General had no right to act.... It is entirely for him to
judge whether it is in the public interest that he should
act.21
Proceeding to the merits, Lord Reid went on to explain how
the Attorney-General's submission of the case with respect to
the applicable law of contempt was broader than justified by
public policy or by the circumstances of the particular case.
The Attorney-General had based his argument on a passage
reported in Vine Products Ltd. v. Green22 which held that a
newspaper never can comment on pending litigation if such
comment would prejudice the case.23 After commenting that
this proposition was "much too widely stated, 24 Lord Reid
went on to explicate the exact difference between his view of
the law and that of the Attorney-General and the divisional
court as applied to the facts of this particular case. He stated:
The crucial question on this point of the case is whether
it can ever be permissible to urge a party to a litigation to
forego his legal rights in whole or in part. The Attorney-
General argues that it cannot and I think the Divisional
Court has accepted that view. In my view it is permissible so
long as it is done in a fair and temperate way and without
21 Id. at 59.
22 [1966] Ch. 484.
It is a contempt of this court for any newspaper to comment on pending
legal proceedings in any way which is likely to prejudice fair trial of the
action. That may arise in various ways. It may be that the comment is
likely in some way or other to bring pressure upon one or other of the par-
ties to the action so as to prevent that party from prosecuting or from de-
fending the action, or to encourage that party to submit to terms of com-
promise which he otherwise might not have been prepared to entertain, or
influence him in some way in his conduct in the action, which he ought to
be free to prosecute or defend, as he is advised, without being subject to
such pressure.
23 Id. at 495-96.
24 [1973] 3 All E.R. at 61.
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any oblique motive.2"
Lord Reid then proceeded to illustrate the two views by
applying them not only to the proposed article of The Sunday
Times under consideration but also to a previous article actu-
ally published by The Sunday Times on September 24, 1972.
He felt that the published article was clearly intended to
bring pressure on Distillers to increase their offer of settle-
ment. It undertook to do this, not by arguing or exploring the
extent of Distillers' legal liability, but by arguing that "there
are times when to insist upon the letter of the law is as much
exposed to criticism as infringement of another's legal
rights. ' 26 This article was not only intended to persuade Dis-
tillers "to do what they did not want to do," but also seemed
to Lord Reid "to have played a large part in causing Distillers
to offer far more money than they had in mind at that
time. ' 27 "If the view maintained by the Attorney-General
were right," said Lord Reid, "I could hardly imagine a clearer
case of contempt of court."'28 Yet when this article was called
to the attention of the Attorney-General by Distillers as a
contempt of court, he decided to take no action. This decision,
in Lord Reid's view, was quite correct.
Turning then to the article under consideration, Lord
Reid summarized it by saying that "it consists in the main of
detailed evidence and argument intended to show that Distill-
ers did not exercise due care to see that thalidomide was safe
before they put it on the market. '29 Publication would intro-
duce a new element into the public debate in contravention of
what "is in this country a strong and generally held feeling
that trial by newspaper is wrong and should be prevented."' 0
Lord Reid then tried to express what he regarded as the un-
derlying reasons for avoiding trial by press:
25 Id. at 61 (footnotes omitted).
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id. This feeling does not rest simply on the concern that "issues must not be
prejudged in a manner likely to affect the mind of those who may later be witnesses
or jurors" but rather on "the wider proposition that trial by newspaper is intrinsically
objectionable." Id.
[Vol. 68
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I think that anything in the nature of prejudgment of a
case or of specific issues in it is objectionable not only be-
cause of its possible effect on that particular case but also
because of its side effects which may be far reaching. Re-
sponsible 'mass media' will do their best to be fair, but there
will also be ill-informed, slapdash, or prejudiced attempts to
influence the public. If people are led to think that it is easy
to find the truth disrespect for the processes of the law
could follow and, if mass media are allowed to judge, unpop-
ular people and unpopular causes will fare very badly. Most
cases of prejudging of issues fall within the existing authori-
ties on contempt. I do not think that freedom of the press
would suffer and I think that the law would be clearer and
easier to apply in practice if it is made a general rule that it
is not permissible to prejudge issues in pending cases.31
Having thus arrived at a general principle suitable for the
disposition of the particular case, Lord Reid added a few
qualifications and some comments on the reasons given by the
court of appeal for discharging the injunction. In some cases
of technical contempt, he said, the fault might be so venial
and the consequences so trifling that it would be wrong to im-
pose punishment.3 2 Furthermore, "it would be wrong and con-
trary to existing practice to limit proper criticism of judg-
ments already given but under appeal. 3 3 With respect to the
issue of dormancy, he was content to say simply that "active
negotiations for settlement were going on all the time" and "if
there is no undue procrastination in the negotiations for a set-
tlement I do not see how in this context an action can be said
to be dormant."3 4 One cannot help wondering whether some
pains were taken in the course of the argument to dispel the
impression of complete stalemate in the negotiations. Indeed
Lord Reid went so far as to state that "[t]he information set
before us gives us hope that the general lines of a settlement
of the whole of this unfortunate controversy may soon
emerge. 3 5 Finally, with respect to the significance attached
31 Id.
32 Id. at 65.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 66.
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by the English Court of Appeal to the debate in the House of
Commons, Lord Reid said: "so far as I have noticed there was
little said in the House which could not have been said
outside if my view of the law is right.""6
All of the participating Law Lords agreed with Lord
Reid's conclusion with respect to the contemptuous character
of the proposed article; they also joined with him in disap-
proving the court of appeal's criticism of the Attorney-Gen-
eral for having himself brought the proceedings. Nor were any
of the five Law Lords impressed with the suggestion that the
litigation was in fact dormant where there were live prospects
of settlement. However, only two of the other Law Lords,
Lord Morris of Borthy-Gest and Lord Cross of Chelsea,
agreed with the significance Lord Reid attached to his distinc-
tion between the two articles: that the first article appealed
only to the moral sense of Distillers, whereas the second ar-
gued as well their negligence and legal liability.
37
In his opinion, Lord Cross made it clear that while he
proscribed discussion of all pending legal and factual issues,
commentary on possible absolute liability for those who trade
s6 Id.
37 Id. at 70. Lord Morris also added the observation that "[1]ikewise there could
have been no objection to the forceful advocacy of a view that liability in such cases
as those under consideration should not have to depend upon proof of negligence or
fault." Id.
Lord Cross of Chelsea also expanded on what Lord Reid had stated as the under-
lying reasons for such a general rule against public discussion of the issues, stating:
It is easy enough to see that any publication which prejudges an issue in
pending proceedings ought to be forbidden if there is any real risk that it
may influence the tribunal - whether judge, magistrates, or jury, or any of
those who may be called upon to give evidence when the case comes to be
heard. But why, it may be said, should such a publication be prohibited
when there is no such risk? The reason is that one cannot deal with a par-
ticular publication in isolation. A publication prejudging an issue in pend-
ing litigation which is itself innocuous enough may provoke replies which
are far from innocuous but which, as they are replies, it would seem unfair
to restrain. So gradually the public would become habituated to look for-
ward to, and resent the absence of preliminary discussions in the 'media' of
any case which aroused widespread interest. An absolute rule-though it
may seem to be unreasonable if one looks only to the particular case - is
necessary in order to prevent a gradual slide towards trial by newspaper or
television.
Id. at 84.
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in drugs or the adequacy of the customary methods for assess-
ing damages in personal injury cases was not prohibited. 8 It is
not entirely clear from the discussion whether these broader
questions could have become issues in the pending or prospec-
tive litigation. Apparently, it was assumed that they were not
so involved.
The partially dissenting Law Lords, Lord Diplock and
Lord Simon of Glaisdale, regarded the majority's view of con-
tempt as too narrow. Lord Diplock set forth his stance in this
forceful passage:
In my opinion, a distinction is to be drawn between pri-
vate persuasion of a party not to insist on relying in pending
litigation on claims or defenses to which he is entitled under
the existing law, and public abuse of him for doing so. The
former, so long as it is unaccompanied by unlawful threats,
is not in my opinion contempt of court; the latter is at least
a technical contempt, and this whether or not the abuse is
likely to have any effect upon the conduct of that particular
litigation by the party publicly abused. For the public mis-
chief in allowing a litigant to be held up to public obloquy
for availing himself in a court of justice of rights to which he
is entitled under the law as it stands at the time, lies in the
inhibiting effect which it might have upon all potential suit-
ors if it were to become the common belief that to have re-
course to the established courts of law for ascertainment and
enforcement of their legal rights and obligations would make
them a legitimate target of public abuse. If laws are unjust
they ought to be changed .... A campaign to change them
should be directed to persuading parliament of the need, not
to vilifying individual litigants for exercising their rights
under the law as it stands. If a campaign directed to the
latter object were to succeed in deterring litigants from en-
forcing their legal rights in courts of law which are under a
constitutional duty to enforce them, the practical result
would be to substitute government by the 'media' for gov-
ernment by parliament in the particular field of legislation
with which the campaign was concerned.39
Lord Simon adopted Lord Diplock's view except for the
'8 Id. at 85.
" Id. at 76.
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latter's suggestion that private pressure on a litigant, as dis-
tinguished from public pressure, would never be contempt. °
Lord Simon also addressed the issue of balancing the public
interest in freedom of discussion against the public interest in
due administration of justice, stating that adoption of a case-
by-case balancing process would not be satisfactory because it
would not furnish sufficient advance guidance.41 This was pro-
vided, for example, by the major distinction that had been
drawn between pending litigation and concluded litigation.
Even with respect to this some qualifications were recognized.
One exception was where the public debate pre-existed the lit-
igation; even though the continued debate might interfere
with the litigation, the law allows the debate to continue.42
Another qualification was where the case was pending in an
appellate court.43
Finally, Lord Simon took the occasion to comment on At-
torney-General v. London Weekend Television Ltd.,44 de-
cided by the same divisional court which had rendered the de-
cision in The Sunday Times case. This case held that a
television program discussing the proposed settlement in the
thalidomide litigation was not a contempt of court. That pro-
40 Instead, Lord Simon stated that:
[p]rivate pressure to interfere with the due course of justice will only be
acceptable within narrow limits. . . . It is the fact of interference, not the
particular form that it may take, that infringes the public interest ....
The only difference is that private pressure on a litigant (in contra-distinc-
tion to violence or bribery or public execration) might sometimes be justifi-
able, while private pressure on the tribinal or witness never would be so.
The justification for private pressure on a litigant might be such a common
interest that fair, reasonable and moderate personal representations would
be appropriate.
Id. at 80.
' To attempt to strike anew in each case the balance . . . would not be
satisfactory. The law would then be giving too uncertain a guidance in a
matter of daily concern, and its application would tend to vary with the
length of the particular judge's foot. The law must lay down some general
guide lines.
Id. at 81.
1, Id. at 82. "The situation of public debate involves that there is probably at
stake some matter of which the public has a legitimate interest to be informed; and
the law, in pragmatic judgment says that conditionally the debate may continue." Id.
43 Id. at 83.
4 [1972] 3 All E.R. 1146 (Q.B. Div'l Ct.).
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gram had avoided any discussion of legal liability, but had
emphasized that the settlement proposed by Distillers was
considerably below the one made between the Swedish
thalidomide distributor and Swedish victims. The court found
that the comparison was in some respects inaccurate and un-
fair, but it also found that the inaccuracy was not deliberate.
Taking this into account, and also considering the total im-
pact of the program, the divisional court had concluded, with
some hesitation, that "we find ourselves unable to say in this
case, with that degree of conviction which we should demand,
that this programme shown once only would result in the cre-
ation of a serious risk that the course of justice would be in-
terfered with. '45 Recognizing that the divisional court had ac-
tually seen and heard the television program, Lord Simon
concluded "from its description in the judgment, I should
have thought that there was at least a technical contempt.
4 6
This was quite contrary to the view of the same program by
Lord Reid, who stated in the course of his opinion:
So far as I can judge from the report it seems to have
had much the same object and character as "The Sunday
Times" article of September 24. If the view which I take
about that article is correct, then I think that for similar
reasons the television program was not in contempt of
court.4
The more limited view of contempt adopted by the ma-
jority of the participating Law Lords was reflected in the
terms of the injunction approved by the House of Lords,
which read:
That the defendants ... be restrained from publishing
... any article or matter which prejudges these issues of
negligence, breach of contract or breach of duty, or deals
with the evidence relating to any of the said issues arising in
any actions pending or imminent against Distillers Co. (Bio-
chemicals) Ltd. in respect of the development or use of the
drug "thalidomide.
4 8
41 Id. at 1152.
46 [1973] 3 All E.R. at 83.
47 Id. at 63.
" Id. at 87.
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The matter was not, however, to be concluded so simply.
II. EUROPEAN COMMISSION AND COURT PROCEEDINGS
On January 19, 1974, six months after the decision of the
House of Lords, the publisher of The Sunday Times, the
newspaper's editor, Mr. Harold Evans, and a group of journal-
ists on its staff lodged with the European Commission of
Human Rights an application against the United Kingdom
charging a violation of articles 10, 14, and 18 of the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms.49 In its March 21, 1975 decision, the com-
mission declared the application admissible and accepted it. 0
In its report to the European Court of Human Rights on May
18, 1977, dealing with the merits of the application, the com-
mission expressed the opinion, by eight votes to five, that the
restriction imposed on the applicants' right to freedom of ex-
pression was in breach of article 10 of the convention but re-
ported unanimously that there had been no breach of articles
41 The convention came into force on September 3, 1953. Various protocols have
come into force since that date. The text of the convention and the protocols, the
decisions and reports of the commission, and the judgments of the court may be
found in the annual Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS. Decisions and reports of the
commission are also published more frequently in a separate series. General texts on
the convention include: F. CASTBERG, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HumAN RIGHTS
(1974); J. FAWCETr, THE APPLICATION OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUhlAN
RIGHTS (1969); F. JACOBS, EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (1976); A. RoB-
ERTSON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE (1963); G. WEIL, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS (1963). See also Cohen, International Adjudication of Human
Rights: A Survey of its Procedural and Some of its Substantive Holdings, 7 GA. J.
INT'L & Comp. L. 315 (1977); Wright, The European Commission of Human Rights, 3
BROOK. J. INT'L LAW 119 (1977).
60 Article 28 provides that the commission's first responsibility is to determine
whether an application meets the jurisdictional and procedural requirements of the
convention. If it determines that these requirements are met, it then proceeds to hear
and make a report on the merits unless it first succeeds in effecting a friendly settle-
ment. According to article 31, the report of the commission is first submitted in confi-
dence to the Committee of Ministers of European Community and to the states con-
cerned. Under article 47, the court may deal with a case only after the commission
has acknowledged its failure to effect a friendly settlement. A case may be brought
before the court by (a) the commission; (b) a high contracting party whose nation is
alleged to be a victim; (c) a high contracting party which referred the case to the
commission; (d) a high contracting party against which the complaint has been lodg-
ed. EUR. CONy. ON HUMAN RIGHTS arts. 28, 31, 47. The Sunday Times case was re-
ferred to the court by the commission.
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14 and 18. The court, like the commission, was unanimous in
finding no violation of those two articles. 51
Article 10, the pivotal article for the purposes of both the
court and the commission, reads as follows:
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of expression.
This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to re-
ceive and impart information and ideas without interference
by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article
shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of
broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.
(2) The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries
with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such
formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are pre-
scribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in
the interests of national security, territorial integrity or pub-
lic safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the
protection of health or morals, for the protection of the rep-
utation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of
information received in confidence, or for maintaining the
authority and impartiality of the judiciary.52
Prior to the proceedings before the European commission
and court, the public record in The Sunday Times litigation
had been something like a production of Hamlet without the
Prince of Denmark. The principal subject of the litigation, the
proposed article, had been disclosed to the courts, but its con-
tents had been only briefly summarized in the judicial opin-
ions. On June 23, 1976, however, after the House of Lords de-
cision, the Queen's Bench Divisional Court granted an
application by the Attorney-General for the discharge of the
injunction. The reason for the discharge was that most of the
claims against Distillers had been settled, leaving only four
"1 Article 14 of the convention provides: "The enjoyment of the rights and free-
doms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any
ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national
or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status."
EuR. CoNy. ON HUMAN RIGHTS art. 14.
Article 18 provides: "The restrictions permitted under this Convention to the
said rights and freedoms shall not be applied for any purpose other than those for
which they have been prescribed." EuR. CONy. ON HUMAN RIGHTS art. 18.51 EUR. CONV. ON HUMAN RIGHTS art. 10.
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pending actions; these four could have been brought before
the courts by then if they had been diligently pursued. Addi-
tionally, the terms offered by Distillers had been improved
significantly since the issuing of the first injunction. When the
injunction was lifted, however, the article as published was
not quite the same as that originally proposed. This was be-
cause parts of the article had to be deleted in response to an-
other injunction issued July 31, 1974, forbidding publication
of certain matters based on information received in confidence
by the parents' advisers during the thalidomide litigation.53
53 The published article, as quoted by the European Court of Human Rights,
opened by asserting that Distillers:
- relied heavily on the German tests and had not completed full trials of
its own before marketing the drug;
- failed to uncover in its research into medical and scientific literature the
fact that a drug related to thalidomide could cause monster births;
- before marketing the drug did no animal tests to determine the drug's
effect on the foetus;
- accelerated the marketing of the drug for commercial reasons, and was
not deflected by a warning from one of its own staff that thalidomide was
far more dangerous than had been supposed;
- was not deflected by the discovery that thalidomide could damage the
nervous system, in itself a hint that it might damage the foetus;
- continued to advertise the drug as safe for pregnant women up to a
month from when it was withdrawn.
The Sunday Times case at 6-7, 18 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 937. (1979)
The article then gave a more detailed history of the steps taken by Distillers,
showing that the distribution and advertising of the new drug occurred at the same
time that Distillers was conducting research and responding to inquiries with respect
to the drug's safety and effectiveness. The article concluded as follows:
So the burden of making certain that thalidomide was safe fell squarely
on [Distillers]. How did the company measure up to this heavy responsibil-
ity? It can be argued that:
1. [Distillers] should have found all the scientific literature about drugs
related to thalidomide. It did not.
2. It should have read Thiersch's work on the effects on the nervous sys-
tem of drugs related to thalidomide, have suspected the possible action on
unborn babies and therefore have done tests on animals for teratogenic ef-
fect. It did not.
3. It should have done further tests when it discovered that the drug had
anti-thyroid activity and unsuspected toxicity. It did not.
4. It should have had proof before advertising the drug as safe for preg-
nant women that this was in fact so. It did not.
For [Distillers] it could be argued that it sincerely believed that
thalidomide was free from any toxicity at the time it was first put on the
market in Britain; that peripheral neuritis did not emerge as a side effect
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The opinion of the European Court of Human Rights, af-
ter stating the facts and summarizing the judgments of the
English courts, described proposals for reform of the English
law of contempt of court, particularly the Report of the Com-
mittee on Contempt of Court' presented to Parliament by
the Lord High Chancellor and Lord Advocate in December,
1974. This report, according to the court, emphasized both
"the uncertainty of the present state of the law regarding
publications dealing with legal proceedings" and also ex-
pressed "the opinion that the balance had moved too far
against the freedom of the press. It therefore made various
proposals for reform, both to redress the balance and in order
to achieve greater certainty in the law." 5 The European
Court also noted, however, that "[o]ne member of the com-
mittee remarked that, despite the suppression of the Sunday
Times article, the campaign of protest and pressure over the
thalidomide tragedy made a mockery of the law of
contempt." 56
As to the claims asserted under article 10 of the European
Convention, the court explained that the applicants alleged
that the "violation arises by reason, firstly, of the injunction
granted by the English Courts and, secondly, of the continu-
ing restraints to which they are subjected as a result of the
over-breadth and lack of precision of the law of contempt of
court. ' 57 The commission had confined its opinion, with re-
spect to a violation of article 10, to the injunction itself. Nev-
until the drug had been on sale in Britain for two years; that testing for
teratogenic effects was not general in 1958; that if tests had been done on
the usual laboratory animals nothing would have shown because it is only
in the New Zealand white rabbit that thalidomide produces the same ef-
fects as in human beings; and, finally, that in the one clinical report of
thalidomide being given to pregnant women no serious results followed (be-
cause thalidomide is dangerous only during the first 12 weeks of
pregnancy).
There appears to be no neat set of answers ....
Id. at 8, 18 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS at 938-39.
"This report was also known as the Phillimore Report. Lord Phillimore was one
of the judges who participated in the decision of the English Court of Appeal.
The Sunday Times case at 17-18; 18 Iwr'L LEGAL MATERIALS at 946.
Id. at 18; 18 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALs at 946-47.
67 Id. at 20; 18 INT'L LEGAL MATERiALS at 949.
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ertheless, the principal delegate of the commission, in his ar-
gument to the court, also urged that the English law of
contempt had been left in such a state of uncertainty by the
judgment of the House of Lords, that there was a continuing
violation of article 10.
In response to these contentions, the court concluded that
"[ilt is clear that there was an interference by public author-
ity in the exercise of the applicants' freedom of expression
which is guaranteed by paragraph 1 of Article 10."' s Appar-
ently, the court meant to limit this particular statement to the
exact terms of the injunction ordered by the House of Lords
as distinguished from the principles of contempt of court as
enunciated in the various judgments of the House of Lords.
This is apparent partly because the court quoted the exact
terms of the injunction and also because the court regarded
its jurisdiction as limited by the scope of the application and
the commission's decision on admissibility."9 In short, then,
the injunction was the "interference" mentioned in section 1
of article 10, but the ultimate question was whether the rules
of contempt of court as applied in the decision justified the
interference under section 2 of article 10.
The European Court then addressed the question
whether the interference was indeed "prescribed by law"
within the meaning of paragraph 2. First, the court had no
doubt that these words were not limited to legislation but in-
cluded the common law as well. To hold otherwise "would de-
prive a common-law State which is Party to the Convention of
the protection of Article 10 § 2 and strike at the very roots of
Id. at 21; 18 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS at 949.
", With respect to the second ground [the uncertainty of the English law of
contempt of court] the Court recalls that "its jurisdiction in contentious
matters is limited to applications which have first of all been lodged with
and accepted by the Commission". ... In the present case, the Commis-
sion, in its decision of 21 March 1975 on the admissibility of the applica-
tion, specified that the question before it was 'whether the rules of con-
tempt of court as applied in the decision of the House of Lords granting the
injunction are a ground justifying the restriction under Article 10 § 2.' The
Commission's examination of the merits of the case was limited to that very
question.
Id. at 20; 18 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALs at 949.
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that State's legal system." 60 This did not, however, answer the
applicants' argument that "legislation is required only if...
the common-law rules are so uncertain that they do not sat-
isfy. . . the principle of legal certainty."'" Responding to this
argument, the court postulated two requirements that were
deemed to flow from the expression "prescribed by law."
These were that "the law be adequately accessible" and sec-
ondly that it be "formulated with sufficient precision to en-
able the citizen to regulate his conduct. 61 2 In applying these
tests to the present cause, the court recognized some compli-
cations because the various Law Lords had relied on different
principles. 3 Some seemed to adopt the principle applied by
the Queen's Bench Divisional Court; namely, that a "deliber-
ate attempt to influence the settlement of pending proceed-
ings by bringing public pressure to bear on a party constitutes
contempt of court (the 'pressure principle'; . .. ).,,64 But other
Law Lords "preferred the principle that it is contempt of
court to publish material which prejudges, or is likely to cause
public prejudgment of, the issues raised in pending litigation
(the 'prejudgment principle'; . . .).,,61 The reader may recog-
nize this analysis as consistent with the writer's rendering of
the two principle views of the Law Lords, the "prejudgment
principle" being espoused by the majority of three,66 and the
"pressure principle" by the minority of two. 7 The court also
considered to what extent either or both of these principles
had been foreshadowed in prior English case law. In this en-
deavor, less difficulty was experienced in finding clear author-
ity for the "pressure principle" than for the "prejudgment
principle." Nevertheless, some authority was found for both.
As to the first principle, Mr. Justice Buckley, speaking in
60 Id. at 21; 18 INT'L LEGAL MATER LS at 950.
El Id. at 22; 18 INT'L LEGAL MATERALS at 950.
62 Id.; 18 INT'L LEGAL MATERLS at 950-51.
63 Id.; 18 INT'L LEGAL MATERALs at 951.
4Id.
" Id.
See text accompanying notes 30-31 supra for a discussion of Lord Reid's ap-
plication of the "prejudgment principle."
'7 See text accompanying notes 39-43 supra for a discussion of the minority view
(the "pressure principle").
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Vine Products v. Green68 was quoted; with respect to the lat-
ter, Lord Justice Cotton in Hunt v. Clarke was relied upon.
To this writer it seems that a more accurate statement of
the English law laid down by the House of Lords would have
been to recognize the prejudgment principle as a qualification
of the pressure principle. In other words, Lord Reid and the
two colleagues who agreed with him did not reject the pres-
sure principle in its entirety; rather, they espoused the view
that public pressure exerted against one of the parties to in-
duce him to settle or abandon litigation was not objectionable
if it was based on a discussion of issues not involved in the
litigation; it was objectionable, however, if it was based on a
discussion of issues that were to be determined in the litiga-
tion. If this is a correct analysis of the majority view, the pub-
lishers of The Sunday Times could not have been prejudiced
by its adoption in preference to the minority view. Instead
they were assured that they could continue with their so-
called moral crusade against Distillers, so long as they did not
contaminate it with discussion of the factual issues which
would have to be resolved if the litigation proceeded to trial.
This also seems to be consistent with the advice given The
Sunday Times by its attorneys. The newspaper was appar-
ently forewarned that it skated on thinner ice when it em-
barked on a discussion of the negligence issue, as contrasted
with the moral aspects involved. Finally, it is difficult for this
writer to understand why the prior uncertainty of the English
law with respect to either or both of these principles of con-
tempt of court should have been relevant in a case in which
there was no prosecution for contempt committed prior to the
decision of the House of Lords. If the principles espoused by
the Law Lords in their judgments were sufficient to justify the
injunction as prescribed, as they obviously were in the minds
of all of the Lords, they should also have been sufficient to
satisfy the requirement of "prescribed by law" in section 2 of
article 10. An even more radical view, which also commends
itself to the writer, would simply be to hold that the terms of
- [1966] Ch. 484, 495-96.
69 [1889] 58 L.J.Q.B. 490.
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the injunction, so long as it was issued in accordance with es-
tablished legal procedure, would satisfy the requirement of
"prescribed by law." The reasons or principles espoused by
the Law Lords would be relevant only in appraising the vari-
ous interests which must be served by the injunction in order
to satisfy one or more of the other requirements mentioned in
section 2 of article 10. It is that aspect of the opinion to which
we now turn.
Among the interests explicitly mentioned in section 2 of
article 10 as possible justification for interference with free-
dom of expression are "protection of the rights of others" and
"maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judici-
ary."M0 The applicants, the government of the United King-
dom, and the minority of the commission all took the view
that both of these protected interests were relevant to the
type of interference involved. The European Court of Human
Rights, however, accepted the view of the majority of the
commission that interests of litigants were included within the
phrase "maintaining the authority and impartiality of the ju-
diciary" and consequently did not have to be considered sepa-
rately as part of "the protection of. . . the rights of others."
The court then listed the various reasons given by the Law
Lords in reaching their decision, including both prejudgment
of the issues through public discussion and pressure on the
litigants which might inhibit their recourse to the courts. The
court regarded all of the reasons listed as "falling within the
aim of maintaining the 'authority of the judiciary' "71 and con-
sequently legitimate under article 10 section 2. The "imparti-
ality" of the judiciary was deliberately omitted from this lit-
any of permissible aims, because all of the Law Lords
assumed that the impartiality of judges was not threatened.
This analysis left as the crucial issue for decision whether
the interference was properly regarded as "necessary in a
democratic society" for maintaining the authority of the judi-
ciary. In pursuing this issue, the court first addressed the
meaning of the term "necessary," in a manner somewhat rem-
70 See text accompanying note 52 supra for a full statement of article 10.
71 The Sunday Times case at 25; 18 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS at 954.
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iniscent of Chief Justice Marshall's exposition of the neces-
sary and proper clause in McCulloch v. Maryland.7 2 "Neces-
sary" was not considered synonymous with "indispensable,"
but neither was it so flexible as the words "admissible," "ordi-
nary," "useful," "reasonable," or "desirable." Rather it im-
plied the existence of a "pressing social need. '73 Apparently it
was not to be regarded as quite as flexible as our "necessary
and proper" clause.
The court recognized that article 10 section 2 leaves to
the contracting states "a margin of appreciation. 7 4 This is
language occasionally used in European Court opinions to in-
dicate an area of discretion accorded to the governing bodies
of the members of the convention and to emphasize a measure
of respect that is to be accorded their judgments regarding
domestic problems."5 Yet the court was unwilling to concede
1 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1818).
7- The Sunday Times case at 25; 18 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS at 594.
74 Id.
75 For example, compare the majority and partially dissenting opinions in "Re-
lating to Certain Aspects of the Laws on the Use of Languages in Education in
Belgium" Case, [1963] Y. B. EUR. CONY. ON HumAN RIGHTS 24-26, 65-68. This case
involved a challenge to the validity of language regulations in primary and intermedi-
ate education in Belgium schools, a challenge primarily based on article 14 (the anti-
discrimination provision) of the convention. See note 51 supra for the full text of
article 14. For the most part, but not entirely, the regulations were sustained.
The majority opinion in an introductory passage stated:
In attempting to find out in a given case, whether or not there has been
an arbitrary distinction, the Court cannot disregard those legal and factual
features which characterise the life of the society in the State which, as a
Contracting Party, has to answer for the measure in dispute. In so doing it
cannot assume the role of the competent national authorities, for it would
thereby lose sight of the subsidiary nature of the international machinery of
collective enforcement established by the Convention.
Id. at 866.
The dissenters agreed with the general principles but thought that they had not
been properly applied because, "the judgment has not sufficiently taken account of
the rule according to which the national authorities, who must appreciate the require-
ments implied by the factual and legal features in issue, remain free to choose the
measures which they consider appropriate in those matters which are governed by the
Convention." Id. at 982.
Attention should also be directed to the judgment of the court in "Ireland
against The United Kingdom" case, [1978] Y. B. EUR. CONY. ON HUaAN RIGHTS 62.
One of the issues concerned the application of article 15, which provides in part:
1. In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the
nation any High Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its
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that its "supervision is limited to ascertaining whether a re-
spondent State exercised its discretion reasonably, carefully
and in good faith."78 The court also suggested that the margin
of appreciation was not necessarily the same as regards each
of the aims listed in article 10 section 2. For example, it might
be greater in a case involving the regulation of morals.7
The court rejected the argument urged by the minority of
the commission and the government that the concluding
words of article 10 section 2 were especially designed to pro-
tect the common law of contempt of court as recognized by
the English courts.7 8 In this connection, and perhaps in dero-
obligations under this Convention to the extent strictly required by the exi-
gencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent
with its other obligations under international lav'.
EuR. CoNY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS art. 15.
In the course of upholding under this article the emergency measures with re-
spect to arrest, custody and detention which were taken for the purpose of controlling
terrorism in Northern Ireland, the court stated:
It falls in the first place to each Contracting State, with its responsibility
for 'the life of [its] nation', to determine whether that life is threatened by
a 'public emergency' and, if so, how far it is necessary to go in attempting
to overcome the emergency. By reason of their direct and continuous con-
tact with the pressing needs of the moment, the national authorities are in
principle in a better position than the international judge to decide both on
the presence of such an emergency and on the nature and scope of deroga-
tions necessary to avert it. In this matter Article 15 § 1 leaves those author-
ities a wide margin of appreciation.
[1978] Y.B. EuR. CONy. ON HUMAN RIGHTS at 68.
16 The Sunday Times case at 26; 18 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS at 955.
77 The court referred to Richard Handyside v. United Kingdom, [1976] Y. B.
EUR. CoNv. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 506. This citation only provides a summary of the case.
References to the text of the opinion are from the pamphlet form [hereinafter cited
as Handyside]. The case, decided on December 7, 1976, involved a conviction under
the British Obscene Publications Act, for distribution of a book partly designed for
the sex education of school children. In speaking of Handyside, the court said the
view taken by the Contracting States of the 'requirements of morals',...
'varies from time to time and from place to place, especially in our era', and
'State authorities are in principle in a better position than the international
judge to give an opinion on the exact content of these requirements.'
Id. The same could not be said of the "far more objective notion of the 'authority' of
the judiciary." Id. For a detailed discussion of Handyside, see notes 159-79 infra and
accompanying text.
7' Rather the opinion reads:
[T]he Court considers that the reason for the insertion of those words
would have been to ensure that the general aims of the law of contempf of
court should be considered legitimate aims under Article 10 § 2 but not to
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gation of the persuasiveness of the English law, the court took
special note of both "the existence of a variety of reasoning
and solutions in the judicial decisions,' 7 9 and the proposals
for reform or at least reconsideration of the English law set
out in the Philhimore Report and Government Green Paper
commenting on it.
It is not entirely surprising that general observations such
as the foregoing should have been the springboard for inten-
sive examination of the peculiarities of the thalidomide litiga-
tion itself. The court noted, for example, that while public
pressure on Distillers to make more generous offers of settle-
ment was one of the grounds relied upon by the English
judges, even in 1972 the article would not have added much to
the pressure already existing. This was particularly so in July
of 1973 when the House of Lords rendered its decision, after
the thalidomide case had been the subject of debate in Parlia-
ment and also of a nationwide campaign in the press. In so far
as the speeches in the House of Lords emphasized the "pre-
judgment principle," the court thought it relevant that "the
proposed Sunday Times article was couched in moderate
terms and did not present just one side of the evidence or
claim that there was only one possible result at which a court
could arrive."' 0
The court recognized that the "publication of the pro-
posed article might well have provoked replies." However, the
same would have been true of any publication that referred to
the "facts underlying or the issues arising in litigation. As
items in that category do not inevitably impinge on the 'au-
thority of the judiciary,' the Convention cannot have been in-
tended to permit the banning of all of them."'81 Consequently,
one could not decide whether this reason was sufficient with-
out examining all of the surrounding circumstances. Such
facts included that "the negotiations were very lengthy, con-
make that law the standard by which to assess whether a given measure
was "necessary."
Id. at 27; 18 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS at 955.
11 Id.; 18 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS at 956.
80 Id. at 28; 18 INT'L LEGAL MATERiALS at 957.
81 Id.
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tinuing for several years, and that at the actual moment when
publication of the article was restrained the case had not
reached the stage of trial. '82 Likewise, when the injunction
was discharged, an action between Distillers and their insurers
involving the issue of negligence was still outstanding. "Dis-
charge of the injunction in these circumstances prompts the
question whether the injunction was necessary in the first
place.1
8 3
Apparently the government had already responded to
that question in its argument. It had argued that it was "a
matter of balancing the public interest in freedom of expres-
sion and the public interest in the fair administration of jus-
tice; ... that the injunction was a temporary measure and
...that the balance, on being struck again in 1976 when the
situation had changed, fell on the other side."8 Perhaps this
reply encouraged the court to do some balancing on its own
account. After recalling its previous remarks in the Handyside
judgment regarding the significance of freedom of expression
as "one of the essential foundations of a democratic society," 85
the court elaborated:
These principles are of particular importance as far as
the press is concerned. They are especially applicable to the
field of the administration of justice, which serves the inter-
ests of the community at large and requires the co-operation
of an enlightened public. There is general recognition of the
fact that the courts cannot operate in a vacuum. Whilst they
are the forum for the settlement of disputes, this does not
mean that there can be no prior discussion of disputes else-
where, be it in specialized journals, in the general press or
amongst the public at large. Furthermore, whilst the mass
media must not overstep the bounds imposed in the inter-
ests of the proper administration of justice, it is incumbent
on them to impart information and ideas concerning matters
that come before the courts just as in other areas of public
interest. Not only do the media have the task of imparting
such information and ideas: the public also has a right to
82 Id. at 29; 18 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALs at 958.
$3 Id.
84Id.
85 Id.
1979-801
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
receive them . . ..
From this statement of general principle the court drew
the conclusion that "account must thus be taken of any public
interest aspect of the case. '8 7 It took note of the fact that
some of the Law Lords, after balancing the conflicting inter-
ests, concluded that there should be an absolute rule making
it impermissible to prejudge issues in pending cases and that
the law would be too uncertain if the balance were to be
struck anew in each case. But the court concluded that it had
to take a different approach because it was "faced not with a
choice between two conflicting principles but with a principle
of freedom of expression that is subject to a number of excep-
tions which must be narrowly interpreted."'8 It also had "to
be satisfied that the interference was necessary having regard
to the facts and circumstances prevailing in the specific case
before it."8
Thus the court came back to the peculiarities of the
thalidomide litigation:
It posed the question whether the powerful company which
had marketed the drug bore legal or moral responsibility to-
wards individuals experiencing an appalling tragedy or
whether the victims could demand or hope for indemnifica-
tion only from the community as a whole; fundamental is-
sues concerning protection against and compensation for in-
juries resulting from scientific developments were raised and
many facets of the existing law on these subjects were called
in question.90
The court recognized that both the government and the
minority of the commission had emphasized that there was no
prohibition on discussion of the "wider issues," such as the
principles of the English law of negligence. But the court also
considered that the attempt to divide the wider issues and the
negligence issue was artificial. "The question of where respon-
sibility for a tragedy of this kind actually lies is also a matter
Id.
s Id.
Id. at 30; 18 INT'L LEGAL MATEPrALs at 959.
"Id.
I0 d.
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of public interest."91
Thus, the court concluded, "the interference complained
of did not correspond to a social need sufficiently pressing to
outweigh the public interest in freedom of expression within
the meaning of the Convention." 2 The restraint was not "pro-
portionate to the legitimate aim pursued; it was not necessary
in a democratic society for maintaining the authority of the
judiciary.
' '
19
The dissenting opinion of the nine judges9 4 of the Euro-
pean Court was directed to the ultimate question whether
"the contested interference with freedom of expression was
contrary to the Convention because it could not be deemed
necessary in a democratic society for maintaining the author-
ity and impartiality of the judiciary within the meaning of Ar-
ticle 10 § 2 of the Convention. '95 In approaching this ques-
tion, the dissenters emphasized that
it was clearly with a view to covering this institution [con-
tempt of court], which is peculiar to the legal traditions of
the common-law countries, that the restriction on freedom
of expression aimed at maintaining the authority and impar-
tiality of the judiciary was introduced into the Convention.
A similar restriction is unknown in the law of most of the
member States; absent in the original draft of the Conven-
tion, it was inserted on the proposal of the British
delegation. 9
8
The dissenters then stated pithily: "The difference of
opinion separating us from our colleagues concerns above all
the necessity of the interference and the margin of apprecia-
tion which, in this connection, is to be allowed to the national
$" Id.
12 Id. at 31; 18 IN'L LEGAL MATERALS at 960.
Id.
9 The dissenters were Mr. Wiarda, Mr. Cremona, Mr. Thor Vilhjalmsson, Mr.
Ryssdal, Mr. Ganshof van der Meersch, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, Mrs. Bindschelder-
Robert, Mr. Liesch and Mr. Matscher. The members of the majority were Mr. Bal-
ladore Pallieri, President, Mr. Mosler, Mr. Zekia, Mr. O'Donoghue, Mr. Pedersen, Mr.
Evriginis, Mr. Teitgen, Mr. Lagergren, Mr. G6Ic1ikl, Mr. Pinheiro Farinha and Mr.
Garcia de Enterria.
9 The Sunday Times case at 35.
96 Id.
1979-80]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
authorities. '97 With reference to the part of the question deal-
ing with the necessity of the interference, the dissenters con-
sidered it significant that "the Law Lords put this very ques-
tion to themselves when applying the rules on contempt of
court." '98 The dissenters noted that when the Law Lords ad-
dressed the question, they did so for the purpose of applying
national law, while when "our Court deals with this question,
it does so with reference to Article 10 of the Convention.""
Nevertheless, as was brought out in both the Handyside0 °
and Klass1 ' judgments, "it is for the national authorities to
make the initial assessment of the reality of the pressing so-
cial need implied in each case . . . accordingly, Article 10 § 2
leaves to the Contracting States a margin of appreciation."102
The dissent also notes:
This margin of appreciation involves a certain discretion
and attaches primarily to the evaluation of the danger that a
particular exercise of the freedom safeguarded by Article 10
§ 1 could entail for the interests listed in Article 10 § 2 and
to the choice of measures intended to avoid that danger
.... For the purposes of such an evaluation ... the na-
tional authorities are in principle better qualified than an
international court.103
Up to this point, there is little difference between the
generalities relied upon by the majority and dissenting opin-
ions. However, further into the opinion, differences begin to
appear. For example, the dissenters state that the domestic
margin of appreciation "goes hand in hand with a European
supervision," but they also state that this "supervision" is
concerned, in the first place, with determining whether the
"national authorities have acted in good faith, with due care
and in a reasonable manner when evaluating those facts and
circumstances, as well as the danger that might thereby be oc-
97 Id. at 36.
98 Id.
09 Id. at 37.
100 [1976] Y. B. Eum. CONY. ON Huhm- RIGHTS 506.
101 [1978] Y. B. EUR. CONY. ON Huhi RIGHTS 622.
101 The Sunday Times case at 37.
103 Id.
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casioned for the interests listed in Article 10 § 2. ... 104 The
dissenters then interject this reminder:
[T]here can be no democratic society unless "pluralism, tol-
erance and broadmindedness" . . . find effective expression
in the society's institutional system, and unless this system
is subject to the rule of law, makes basic provision for an
effective control of executive action to be exercised, without
prejudice to parliamentary control, by an independent judi-
ciary ... and assures respect of the human person.105
More specifically, the dissenters note that the majority
takes the view that the margin of appreciation as to issues
concerning the maintenance of the authority of the judiciary
should be narrower than that allowed in relation to issues con-
cerning the protection of morals because the "authority of the
judiciary" is a more objective standard than the protection of
morality. This is a view the dissenters are unable to share.
Even though there might exist a fairly broad measure of
common ground between the Contracting States as to the
substance of Article 6 [dealing with judicial procedures] it
nevertheless remains the fact that the judicial institutions
and the procedure can vary considerably from one country
to another. Thus, contrary to what the majority of the Court
holds, the notion of the authority of the judiciary is by no
means divorced from the national circumstances and cannot
be determined in a uniform way.106
This was particularly pertinent with respect to the law of con-
tempt of court in the United Kingdom which "the authors of
the Convention had. . . in mind when they introduced the
notion of maintaining 'the authority and impartiality of the
judiciary.' ,,107 Consequently, the dissenters concluded that
the House of Lords was "better qualified to decide whether, in
factual circumstances which are for the House to assess, a
given form of restriction on freedom of expression is necessary
for maintaining, in a democratic society, the judiciary's au-
0 Id. at 38.
105 Id.
10 Id. at 39.
107 Id.
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thority within the United Kingdom itself."108
The dissenters went on to consider the particular circum-
stances and grounds of decision to determine whether the
House of Lords had in fact overstepped its margin of appreci-
ation. They emphasized the special character of this particu-
lar article, which the Law Lords had seen as deriving from the
large amount of previously unpublished material dealing with
the issue of Distillers' negligence. This increased the likeli-
hood of the article giving rise to "prejudgment." 109 The dis-
senters concluded:
This is why we consider that the House of Lords, acting on
the basis of the factors which it was evaluating, was "enti-
tled to think" that the publication of the article in question
would have repercussions on pending litigation that would
prejudice the due administration of justice and the authority
of the judiciary. 110
Similarly, in the view of the dissenters, the House of Lords
was entitled to think that in view of the circumstances then
existing the litigation could not be regarded as "dormant." '
The dissenters also recognized that even if the domestic
court's evaluation of the risk involved was reasonable,
whether or not the particular restraint imposed was propor-
tionate to the legitimate end pursued still had to be consid-
ered. In responding affirmatively to this question, the dissent-
ers emphasized that the scope of the restraint was limited as
to both its subject-matter and its duration. With respect to
the first, it related only to the issue of negligence and the evi-
dence in the pending cases. Thus, it left open continued dis-
cussion of the English law of products liability and the moral
side of the case. The dissenters could not see why this distinc-
tion was artificial. With respect to duration, it was clear that
the House of Lords "foresaw the possibility that the situation
might change, that even before the proceedings had been
finally terminated the balance between the interests of justice
lO Id.
109 Id. at 40.
110 Id.
I" Id. at 41.
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and those of freedom of the press might shift, and that the
injunction might be discharged. ' 112 This was indeed the way it
worked out in practice; the injunction was discharged on the
application of the Attorney-General when a settlement had
been reached between Distillers and the great majority of the
claimants, and it had become clear that the few remaining ac-
tions were not being actively pursued. Finally, the dissenters
noted that the applicants had not themselves sought an ear-
lier dissolution.
The three concurring judges expressed the view that the
English law of contempt of court, as illustrated in this case,
was so uncertain that it did not satisfy the requirement of
"prescribed by law" contained in article 10 section 2. This
point was first set forth by Judge Zekia, in an opinion joined
by Judge O'Donoghue. Judge Zekia argued that this un-
certainty flowed both from the variety of tests and criteria ap-
plied and from their subjective character. He found a "glaring
example of the uncertainty and the unsatisfactory state of the
law of contempt touching pending civil proceedings vis-a-vis
press publications in the conflicting opinion, expressed by the
Law Lords on The Sunday Times article of 24 September
1972 about the thalidomide tragedy."" 3 This view was also
supported by the evidence given by Lord Denning and Lord
Salmon before the Phillimore Committee and in the Phili-
more Committee Report. This uncertainty was especially dis-
turbing both because contempt of court was a criminal offense
and because the right of freedom of expression cannot reason-
ably be achieved if it is "handicapped and restricted by legal
rules or principles which are not predictable or ascertainable
even by a qualified lawyer.""" Judge Zekia also suggested that
even if the House of Lords did settle the law by its judgment
in The Sunday Times case, the clarification came too late be-
cause the crucial date was the time the article was submitted
to the divisional court. Finally, in the opinion of Judges Zekia
and O'Donoghue, the prejudgment principle as announced by
the House of Lords did not provide "a reasonably safe
112 Id. at 42.
"I' Id. at 45.
114 Id. at 46.
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guide... . In a matter of public concern. . . it would be very
difficult to avoid. . reference to the issues and evidence in-
volved in a pending case."'115 In a separate concurring opinion,
Judge Evriginis also expressed the view that the "prejudg-
ment principle," as enunciated by the House of Lords, did not
satisfy the requirement of "prescribed by law" in article 10
section 2. As already indicated in discussing the majority
opinion, the writer does not find these arguments very impres-
sive in the context of this particular case.
III. IMPACT OF THE EUROPEAN COURT DECISION ON THE
BRITISH LAW OF CONTEMPT OF COURT
The ultimate impact of the European Court decision
upon the British law of contempt of court can hardly be fore-
told at this early date. Its immediate impact was, of course,
very slight. It will be recalled that even the injunction had
been discharged before the decision of the European Court
was rendered. The only practical effect on the parties was that
it substantially reduced The Sunday Times' share of the costs
of litigation.1" 6 Furthermore, the European Convention, in the
absence of legislation so proclaiming, was not incorporated
into the domestic law of the United Kingdom according to the
established English law of treaties."I7 This bare statement,
I Id. at 47. In a separate concurring opinion, Judge Evriginis expressed similar
views. Id. at 51.
"' Article 50 of the convention provides:
If the Court finds that a decision taken by a legal authority or any other
authority of a High Contracting Party is completely or partially in conflict
with the obligations arising from the present Convention, and if the inter-
nal law of the said Party allows only partial reparation for the consequences
of this decision or measure, the decision of the Court shall, if necessary,
afford just satisfaction to the injured party.
EUR. CoNy. ON HUMAN RIGHTS art. 50.
The applicants requested that the government should pay them a sum equivalent
to the costs and expenses which they had incurred in connection with the contempt
litigation in the English courts and before the commission and the court. The Solici-
tor-General assured the court that it would not have to consider this issue. The Sun-
day Times case at 32-33.
'1 See 8 HALSBURY LAws OF ENGLAND 986 (4th ed. 1974). See L. SOHN & T.
BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1238-65 (1973) for a
comparison of English law with the law of other states that are parties to the
convention.
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however, may be regarded as something of an over-simplifica-
tion. There are statements in the opinions of judges of consid-
erable stature to the effect that the convention, although not
controlling, may in some circumstances be persuasive. Deter-
mining when this may be so is not an easy task.
For example, in Waddington v. Miah118 the issue
presented to the House of Lords was whether a person could
be convicted under the Immigration Act of 1971, which came
into force on January 1, 1973, for an act occurring in 1970.
Lord Reid, speaking for a united House of Lords, stated that
counsel had informed them that he had found no authoriza-
tion for proceedings for an offense which was not an offense
when the act was committed. Lord Reid then remarked:
"That is what I would have expected because there has for a
very long time been a strong feeling against making legisla-
tion, and particularly criminal legislation, retrospective."11
However, Lord Reid also called attention to the facts that
both article 11(2) of the Declaration of Human Rights of the
United Nations and article 7 of the Convention for the Pro-
tection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, ratified
by the United Kingdom in 1951, prohibited criminal punish-
ment for an act which was not a crime under either national
or international law at the time it was committed. His Lord-
ship then added: "So it is hardly credible that any govern-
ment department would promote or that Parliament would
pass retrospective criminal legislation. 1 20 After these intro-
ductory remarks, Lord Reid closely examined the legislation
and concluded that it was not intended to be retrospective.1 21
More directly in point, although not of such high author-
ity, are the opinions of Lord Denning, Roskill, L.J., and Geof-
frey Lane, L.J. for the English Court of Appeal in R. v. Chief
Immigration Officer.1 22 This too was a case arising under the
Immigration Act of 1971, but it involved the right of entry of
the wife and children of a Pakistani citizen who was a resident
'I8 [1974] 2 All E.R. 377 (H.L.).
119 Id. at 379.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 380.
122 [1976] 3 All E.R. 843 (C.A.).
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of England. The wife and children were refused entry, pursu-
ant to a rule of the department, because they did not have an
entry certificate and because the immigration officer did not
believe that they intended to stay only for the two-week pe-
riod requested. When the husband had first come to the
United Kingdom he was a Commonwealth citizen as well as a
citizen of Pakistan. Since the husband's arrival, Pakistan had
withdrawn from the Commonwealth, and the husband had
lost his Commonwealth citizenship. The judges of the court of
appeal were satisfied that the decision of the immigration of-
ficer was justified under the statute and applicable rule. How-
ever, counsel had also argued that the woman and her chil-
dren should have been admitted because of the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms. Attention was called particularly to the
provision of article 8, paragraph (1) providing: "Everyone has
the right to respect for his private and family life, his home
and his correspondence." 123 Attention was also directed to the
fact that the government of the United Kingdom had officially
declared, in accordance with article 25 of the convention, that
the European Human Rights Commission was competent to
receive petitions from persons complaining that rights set
forth in the convention had been violated by the United King-
dom. In response to this argument, Lord Denning made this
careful statement:
The position as I understand it, is that if there is any
ambiguity in our statutes or uncertainty in our law, then
these courts can look to the convention as an aid to clear up
the ambiguity and uncertainty, seeking always to bring them
into harmony with it. Furthermore, when Parliament is en-
acting a statute or the Secretary of State is framing rules,
the courts will assume that they had regard to the provisions
of the convention and intended to make the enactment ac-
cord with the convention, and will interpret them accord-
ingly. But I would dispute altogether that the convention is
part of our law. Treaties and declarations do not become
part of our law until they are made law by Parliament. I
desire, however, to amend one of the statements I made in
123 EUR. CONV. ON HUMAN RIGHTS art. 8.
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R. v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs, ex parte Bhajan
Singh. I said then that the immigration officers ought to
bear in mind the principles stated in the convention. I think
that would be asking too much of the immigration officers.
They cannot be expected to know or to apply the conven-
tion. They must go simply by the immigration rules laid
down by the Secretary of State and not by the convention. I
may also add this. The convention is drafted in a style very
different from the way which we are used to in legislation. It
contains wide general statements of principle. They are apt
to lead to much difficulty in application; because they give
rise to much uncertainty. They are not the sort of thing
which we can easily digest. Article 8 is an example. It is so
wide as to be incapable of practical application. So it is
much better for us to stick to our own statutes and princi-
ples, and only look to the convention for guidance in case of
doubt.12
Substantially the same view was expressed on this point
by the other two judges of the court of appeal. Roskill, L.J.
was even more emphatic in rejecting aid from the convention.
He said in part: "Suffice it to say that a treaty does not be-
come part of the municipal law of this country unless and un-
til it is the subject of legislation in the ordinary way. This is
axiomatic; it has been laid down for many years. "125 Lord Ros-
kill then called disapproving attention to dicta by Scarman,
L.J. in R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex
parte Phansopkar1 2' and Pan-American World Airways, Inc.
v. Department of Trade, 27 including especially the following
statement made after reference to the Magna Carta:
This hallowed principle of our law is now reinforced by the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
1950 to which it is now the duty of our public authorities in
administering the law, including the Immigration Act 1971,
and of our courts in interpreting and applying the law, in-
cluding the Act, to have regard. 2 8
11 R. v. Chief Immigration Officer, [1976] 3 All E.R. at 847-48 (C.A.).
1 2 Id. at 848.
126 [1975] 3 All E.R. 497 (H.L.).
127 [1976] 1 Lloyd's List L.R. 257 (H.L.).
23 [1975] 3 All. E.R. at 511.
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Roskill, L.J. claimed this was "obiter" and also "somewhat too
wide and may call for reconsideration hereafter.
1 29
More recently, in Gleaves v. Deakin,130 a case decided by
the House of Lords, one of the speeches seized the occasion to
refer to the European Convention. This was an application by
certain publishers to quash an order of a magistrate commit-
ting them to stand trial in the criminal court for publishing a
defamatory libel in violation of the Libel Act of 1843. The
criminal proceedings had been instituted by an information
filed by the subject of the libel in accordance with the statute.
The question presented to the House of Lords was whether
the committing magistrate had erred in refusing to permit the
appellants to present evidence of the bad reputation of the
respondent, before making the order of committal. Their
Lordships seemed to have little difficulty in unanimously
reaching the conclusion that the committing magistrate was
correct. As Viscount Dilhorne put it:
It would indeed be extraordinary if publishers of defam-
atory libels could avoid committal for trial by giving evi-
dence of the bad character of the prosecutor when, even if it
was published for the public benefit, that would not avail
them before the examining magistrate and enable them to
avoid committal. 13
1
Yet all of their Lordships seemed especially sensitive to the
unsatisfactory state of the law on this subject and to the need
for some reform, including, for example, the requirement of
obtaining the Attorney-General's consent for the prosecution
of a criminal libel. It was, however, only Lord Diplock who
interjected into the discussion consideration of the European
Convention. He stated in part:
My Lords, under Art 10.2 of the European Convention, the
exercise of the right of freedom of expression may be sub-
jected to restrictions or penalties by a contracting state, only
to the extent that those restrictions or penalties are neces-
sary in a democratic society for the protection of what
129 [1976] 3 All E.R. at 849.
130 [1979] 2 All E.R. 497 (H.L.).
131 Id. at 502.
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(apart from the reputation of individuals and the protection
of information received in confidence) may generally be de-
scribed as the public interest. In contrast to this the truth of
the defamatory statement is not in itself a defence to a
charge of defamatory libel under our criminal law; so here is
a restriction on the freedom to impart information which
states that are parties to the Convention have expressly un-
dertaken to secure to everyone within their jurisdiction. No
onus lies on the prosecution to show that the defamatory
matter was of a kind that is necessary to suppress or penal-
ise in order to protect the public interest. On the contrary,
even though no public interest can be shown to be injuri-
ously affected by imparting to others accurate information
about seriously discreditable conduct of an individual, the
publisher of the information must be convicted unless he
himself can prove to the satisfaction of a jury that the publi-
cation of it was for the public benefit. This is to turn Art 10
of the Convention on its head.
182
Lord Diplock endorsed the suggestion that a step in the right
direction would be to require the consent of the Attorney-
General to be obtained for the institution of any prosecution
for criminal libel. Then he added this pregnant comment, of
particular significance for The Sunday Times case: "In decid-
ing whether to grant his consent in the particular case, the
Attorney-General could then consider whether the prosecu-
tion was necessary on any of the grounds specified in art 10.2
of the Convention and unless satisfied that it was, he should
refuse his consent." 133
Another recent opinion which is especially pertinent to
the problems that might arise in the wake of The Sunday
Times case is that of Sir Robert Megarry, V.C. in Malone v.
Commissioner of Police.13 4 This was an application for an in-
junction against wire-tapping carried on by the Post Office
pursuant to a warrant from the Home Secretary and for an
order requiring the police to return to the plaintiff recordings
of the conversations which had been forwarded to the police
by the Post Office. In an elaborate opinion, the Vice-Chancel-
132 Id. at 498-99.
1"3 Id. at 499.
13, [1979] 2 All E.R. 620.
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lor first concluded there had been no violation of established
English common or statutory law. In reaching this conclusion,
he was not significantly impeded either by "the celebrated ar-
ticle on 'The Right to Privacy' by Samule D. Warren and the
future Brandeis J in the Harvard Law Review" 135 or by the
decision of the United States Supreme Court in Katz v.
United States,136 interpreting the fourth amendment to apply
to wire-tapping. After disposing of these obstacles, the Vice-
Chancellor turned to the argument based on articles 8 and 13
of the European Convention. Article 8 provides:
(1) Every one has the right to respect for his private
and family life, his home and his correspondence.
(2) There shall be no interference by a public author-
ity with this right except such as is in accordance with the
law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests
of national security, public safety or the economic well-being
of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for
the protection of health or morals, or for the rights and free-
doms of others.
137
Article 13 provides: "Every one whose rights and freedoms as
set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effec-
tive remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that
the violation has been committed by persons acting in an offi-
cial capacity."1 38
The Vice-Chancellor explained that counsel's argument,
based on these articles, had what he called "two limbs." '139
The first was that the convention conferred direct rights on
citizens of the United Kingdom; the second was that the con-
vention's provisions should be applied as a guide in interpret-
ing and applying English law in so far as it was ambiguous or
lacking in clarity. But before discussing these contentions, the
Vice-Chancellor thought it worthwhile to examine at some
length a recent decision of the European Court in the Klass
:35 Id. at 631. The article referred to can be found in 4 HARv. L. REV. 193 (1890).
36 389 U.S. 374 (1967).
137 EUR. CONV. ON HUMAN RIGHTS art. 8.
8EUR. CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS art. 13.
19 Malone v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, [1979] 2 All E.R. at 626.
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case, 140 decided on September 6, 1978. The complaint in that
case was that a statute of the Federal Republic of Germany
permitted surveillance of the post and telecommunications
without either requiring the authorities in every case to notify
those concerned after the event, or providing any remedy in
the courts against the ordering or execution of the surveil-
lance. After careful examination of the unanimous opinion of
the European Court which sustained the German statute, the
Vice-Chancellor concluded that the court had made it clear
that a statute permitting such surveillance must contain sig-
nificant safeguards. 141 Among the safeguards provided was the
establishment of special board of five MPs to which the Min-
ister authorizing surveillance had to report and to which indi-
viduals concerned could appeal. If unsuccessful before the
commission, an individual could then apply to the Constitu-
tional Court which could require the authorities to supply in-
formation or produce documents, even if secret, and decide
whether they could be used. The European Court decided
that these safeguards were sufficient to satisfy the require-
ments of articles 8 and 13.
Returning to what he had described as the two limbs of
counsel's argument, the Vice-Chancellor had little difficulty in
cutting off the first; he simply held that the convention did
not "confer any direct rights on the plaintiff that he can en-
force in the English courts. 1' 42 To the second limb of the ar-
gument, "based on the convention and the Klass case as as-
sisting the court to determine what the English law is on a
point on which authority is lacking or uncertain, 1 43 the Vice-
Chancellor paid considerably more respect. He asked the
question: "Can it be said that in this case two courses are rea-
sonably open to the court, one of which is inconsistent with
the Convention and the other consonant with it?"
1 44
The answer was a resounding "No." This was partly be-
cause in Malone, unlike the Kiass case, there was no applica-
1,0 [1978] Y. B. EUR. CONY. ON HuMAN RIGHTS 622.
[1979] 2 All E.R. at 635-36.
142 Id. at 647.
,,3 Id. (citation omitted).
144 Id.
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ble legislation to construe. Furthermore, the Vice-Chancellor
found it "impossible to read the Klass case without it becom-
ing abundantly clear that a system that has no legal safe-
guards whatever has small chance of satisfying the require-
ments of that court, whatever administrative provisions there
may be.' 1 45 As compared with the independent commission
and board of MPs under the German system, the Vice-Chan-
celor said:
[the English] system in operation provides no such indepen-
dence and contains no provision whatever for subsequent
notification. Even if the system were to be considered ade-
quate in its conditions, it is laid down merely as a matter of
administrative procedure, so that it is unenforceable in law,
and as a matter of law could at any time be altered without
warning or subsequent notification. Certainly in law any
"adequate and effective safeguards against abuse" are want-
ing. In this respect English law compares most unfavorably
with West German law; this is not a subject on which it is
possible to feel any pride in English law.
146
At first blush, it might seem as though the Vice-Chancel-
lor was encouraging the plaintiff to carry his case all the way
to the European Court, if he could afford to risk the time and
money. He had in mind, however, a more immediate conclu-
sion for his own purposes. This conclusion was that the job of
bringing English law into consonance with the convention in
this particular area was not an appropriate one for the courts.
As the Vice-Chancellor put it:
Various institutions or offices would have to be brought
into being to exercise various defined functions. The more
complex and indefinite the subject-matter, the greater the
145 Id. at 648. (citation omitted) The Vice-Chancellor's conclusion in this respect
seems to be a correct reading of the Klass opinion. The court indicated that it was
considerably disturbed that the surveillance could be instituted without prior judicial
approval and need never be revealed to the individual concerned. However, the court
concluded that these objections were overcome by other considerations. In accordance
with the requirements of the statute and in actual practice, the initiation of a surveil-
lance, its continuation after a specified period, and a decision not to inform the indi-
vidual after the surveillance was terminated were all closely and regularly monitored
by the entirely independent commission appointed by the Parliamentary Board.
146 Id.
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difficulty in the court doing what is really appropriate, and
only appropriate, for the legislature to do. Furthermore, I
find it hard to see what there is in the present case to re-
quire the English courts to struggle with such a problem.
Give full rein to the convention, and it is clear that when the
object of the surveillance is the detection of crime, the ques-
tion is not whether there ought to be a general prohibition
of all surveillance, but in what circumstances, and subject to
what conditions and restrictions, it ought to be permitted. It
is those circumstances, conditions and restrictions which are
at the centre of this case; and yet it is they which are the
least suitable for determination by judicial decision.14 7
In light of this brief survey of recent English cases on the
domestic application of the convention, what can be ventured
with respect to the prospects for the incorporation of the prin-
ciples of The Sunday Times decision into English law? In the
first place, it might be thought that the closeness of the vote
within the court might detract somewhat from its persuasive-
ness. However, this close vote must be compared with the di-
vision of opinion among the English judges and with the con-
siderable criticism the House of Lord's decision received from
influential sources. This criticism particularly was evident in
the testimony before the Phillimore Committee and in that
committee's report. Addressing the text of contempt adopted
by the majority of the House of Lords, the report stated in
part:
The test of prejudgment might well make for greater
certainty in one direction-provided a satisfactory definition
of prejudgment could be found-but it is by no means clear
that it is satisfactory in others, for instance, in the case of
the 'gagging' writs referred to in paragraphs 84 and 96. It
can be arbitrary in its application. For example, an opinion
expressed on a legal issue in a learned journal would fall
within the description of prejudgment given by Lord Cross
of Chelsea. Again, there has been much discussion and ex-
pression of opinion in scientific journals as to the manner in
which thalidomide operates to produce deformities. These,
too, would fall within the test of prejudgment and would
147 Id.
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therefore be contempts. Furthermore, the scope and precise
meaning of the words "prejudge" or "prejudgment" as used
in the House of Lords are no easier to determine in practice
than the phrase "risk of prejudice." At what point does le-
gitimate discussion or expression of opinion cease to be le-
gitimate and qualify as prejudgment? This may depend as
much upon the quality and the authority of the party ex-
pressing the opinion as upon the nature of the opinion and
the form of its expression. A dictum of Ulpain will carry
more weight from its origin alone than a dozen judgments of
as many long-forgotten but doubtless worthy praetors. Fur-
ther, the expression of opinion and even its repetition can be
framed as to disclaim clearly any intention to offer a con-
cluded judgment and yet be of highly persuasive and influ-
ential character. The simple test of prejudgment therefore
seems to go too far in some respects and not far enough in
others. We conclude that no satisfactory definition can be
found which does not have direct reference to the mischief
which the law of contempt is and always has been designed
to suppress. That mischief is the risk of prejudice to the due
administration of justice.
148
On this point the ultimate conclusion of the committee
was: "We recommend in relation to publications which are al-
leged to affect particular proceedings a statutory definition on
the following lines; 'The test of contempt is whether the pub-
lication complained of creates a risk that the course of justice
will be seriously impeded or prejudiced.' ",149
It is noteworthy that this test is closer to the one adopted
by the judges of the English Court of Appeal and by the Euro-
pean Court than it is to either one of the tests adopted by the
House of Lords. It obviously calls for an examination of all.
the circumstances of the particular case, which is what both
the English Court of Appeal and the European Court of
Human Rights seemed to require. A question might be raised
as to whether this proposed rule would satisfy the test of cer-
tainty or forseeability implied by the European Court from
the requirement of "prescribed by law." It seems that the Eu-
148 REPORT OF THE COMM. ON CONTEMPT OF COURT 48 (1947) [hereinafter cited as
REPORT].
149 Id. at 49.
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ropean Court could hardly refuse to hold as it did because the
guiding principles adopted by the majority of the court, al-
though not exactly the same as those recommended by the
Phillimore Committee, were subject to similar uncertainties in
actual operation. In this connection it may be recalled that
the European Court held that it had "to be satisfied that the
interference was necessary having regard to the facts and cir-
cumstances prevailing in the specific case before it. ' '15° It was
in this context that the court reached the conclusion that the
"interference complained of did not correspond to a social
need sufficiently pressing to outweigh the public interest in
freedom of expression within the meaning of the
Convention." '15
One other aspect of the Phillimore Report, which is
closely related to the decision of the European Court, should
be noted. After making the recommendation quoted above,
the report added:
Finally, even if liability to proceedings for contempt is
restricted to those cases where there is risk of serious
prejudice, there may be cases where for reasons of public
policy it is better not to bring proceedings. Contempt is pe-
culiarly a field where it is legitimate to exercise a discretion
in deciding whether to take proceedings. For example, it is
often better not to give further and greater prominence to
an undesireable publication by bringing proceedings against
it. We return to this point when we consider the role of the
Attorney-General. 5
In discussing the role of the Attorney-General, the report
expressed this view: "We are sure that the Attorney-General
must retain his right to act in the public interest where he
thinks fit to do so.'15 The committee did not believe that this
should be an exclusive jurisdiction, but it did state: "We be-
lieve however that the normal practice should be, especially
where the alleged contempt is in relation to criminal proceed-
ings, that the attention of the Attorney-General should be
11o The Sunday Times case at 30.
151 Id. at 31.
112 REPORT, supra note 148, at 49.
153 Id. at 80.
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drawn to the matter before any private proceedings are be-
gun. ' 154 To the extent that the Attorney-General continues to
play an important role in the initiation of such proceedings, it
would seem that the opinion of the European Court in The
Sunday Times case would be especially significant. It will be
recalled that Lord Diplock, in Gleaves v. Deakin,15 expressed
the opinion that the consent of the Attorney-General should
be required for any prosecution for criminal libel and that the
Attorney-General should not give consent unless satisfied on
one of the grounds specified in article 10 section 2 of the con-
vention. It would seem even clearer that the Attorney-General
should not initiate contempt proceedings if he thought it
could not be justified under the principles announced in The
Sunday Times case.
Until very recently, there had been no indication that the
recommendations of the Phillimore Report would soon be re-
flected in legislation. In fact, the government, in a "Green Pa-
per on Contempt of Court" issued in March of 1978, ex-
pressed misgivings with respect to some of the specific
recommendations and some sympathy for the view that they
would "tip the balance too far against the interests of jus-
tice." 156 However, in the course of a debate in the House of
Lords in May of 1980 on the findings of the Phillimore Com-
mittee, the Lord Chancellor promised that the Contempt Re-
form Bill would be acted upon early next session and could
then be introduced into the House. The Lord Chancellor also
indicated that the basis of the bill must be the Phillimore Re-
port and that he personally accepted the decision of the ma-
jority of the European Court in The Sunday Times case. 7
Meanwhile, the differences between the views expressed
by the House of Lords and those expressed by the European
Court will continue for the immediate future. In the long run,
however, it seems that the balance is bound to shift toward
' Id.
155 [1979] 2 All E.R. 497 (H.L.).
'"See M. ROSEN, THE SUNDAY TIMES THALIDOMIDE CASE: CONTEMPT OF COURT
AND FREEDOM OF THE PRESS 46 (1979). I am indebted to this publication of the Writ-
ers and Scholars Education Trust and the British Institute of Human Rights for call-
ing my attention to many of the recent English developments in this area.
'11 See THE TIMES (London), May 8, 1980, at 16, col. 6.
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the position of the European Court unless the United King-
dom withdraws from the convention or the European Court
retreats from its position.158
IV. The Sunday Times CASE AND THE LAW OF THE
EUROPEAN CONVENTION
For the purpose of assessing the significance of The Sun-
day Times decision in the development of the law of the Eu-
ropean Convention, the most comparable judgment of the Eu-
ropean Court is the one rendered in the Handyside case,159 on
December 7, 1976. Handyside involved the criminal convic-
tion of the proprietor of a publishing firm, accompanied by
the seizure and destruction of numerous copies of the book in
question, under the British Obscene Publications Act. The
book, entitled The Little Red Schoolbook, was deliberately
aimed at school children aged twelve and older. The statutory
definition of obscenity was stated in section 1 as:
1) For the purposes of this Act an article shall be
deemed to be obscene if its effect or (where the article com-
prises two or more distinct items) the effect of any one of its
items is, if taken as a whole, such as to tend to deprave and
corrupt persons who are likely, having regard to all relevant
158 See Mann, Contempt of Court in the House of Lords and the European
Court of Human Rights, 95 L.Q. REv. 348 (1979) for a severe criticism of the judg-
ment rendered by the European Court in The Sunday Times case. This article sug-
gests that the "revising function" of the European Court of Human Rights may be
carried too far:
There will be no alternative but to do what the majority of countries have
done, which have supplied the judges of the European Court of Human
Rights, that is to say, to refuse to make or confirm the declaration under
Article 25 of the Convention submitting this country to individual applica-
tions and thus to the jurisdiction of the European Court.
Id. at 352. When one considers how close the attitude of the European Court was to
the position taken by the Phillimore Committee, it is difficult to understand this
alarm.
A more promising approach suggested in the same article is that "this country
should at long last incorporate and, indeed, entrench the Convention into the law of
the United Kingdom and have its implementation supervised by its own judicial
body." Id. at 353.
See DENNING, THE DuE PROCESS OF LAW 49 (1980) for a more favorable view of
the judgment of the European Court.
159 [1976] Y. B. EUR. CONV. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 506.
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circumstances, to read, see or hear the matter contained in
it. 160
The Act also contained these provisions in section 4:
1) A person shall not be convicted of an offense
against section 2 of this Act and an order of forfeiture shall
not be made under the foregoing section if it is proved that
publication of the article in question is justified as being for
the public good on the ground that it is in the interest of
science, literature, art or learning, or of other object of gen-
eral concern.
2) It is hereby declared that the opinion of experts
may be admitted in any proceedings under this Act either to
establish or negative the said ground.""1
,The case was first heard, with the defendant's consent,
before a magistrate's court without a jury and on appeal to
the Inner London Quarter Sessions Court was again heard
without a jury. That court decided that expert witnesses could
be heard on the question whether the book was obscene in the
sense that it would tend to deprave the children to whom it
was addressed, as well as whether its publication could be jus-
tified under section 4. As a result, seven expert witnesses were
heard on behalf of the prosecution and nine on behalf of the
defense. The judge discounted the evidence for the defense:
The views of the applicant's witnesses had been those
approaching the extreme of one wing of the more broadly
varied outlook on the education and upbringing of children,
whereas the evidence given on behalf of the prosecution
tended to cover those who, although clearly tending in the
opposite direction, were less radical. Looking at the book it-
self, the Court reached the conclusion that on the whole,
and quite clearly through the mind of a child, the School-
book was inimical to good teacher-child relationships; in
particular, there were numerous passages that it found to be
subversive, not only to the authority but to the influence of
the trust between children and teachers. 62
160 The Obscene Publications Act, 1959, 7 & 8 Eliz. 2, ch. 66, § 1.
161 The Obscene Publications Act, 1959, 7 & 8 Eliz. 2, ch. 66, § 4.
102 Handyside, supra note 77, at 10.
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With respect to the tendency to corrupt or deprave, the
court pointed to a passage headed "Be yourself":
Maybe you smoke pot or go to bed with your boyfriend
or girlfriend-and don't tell your parents or teachers, either
because you don't dare to or just because you want to keep
it secret.
Don't feel ashamed or guilty about doing things you re-
ally want to do and think are right just because your parents
or teachers might disapprove. A lot of these things will be
more important to you later in life than the things that are
"approved of."168
The judge then made the point that there was no refer-
ence in the passage to the illegality of smoking pot, although
one could be found many pages later in an entirely different
part of the book. He further observed that no reference at all
was made to the illegality of sexual intercourse between a boy
who was only fourteen years old and a girl not yet sixteen.
The judge conceded that there were a good many passages in
the book, particularly those dealing with venereal diseases,
contraception and abortion, which contained dispassionate,
sensible, and on the whole, completely accurate advice that
should not be denied to young children. On the balance of
probabilities, however, these passages could not outweigh
those which the court was convinced had a tendency to de-
prave and corrupt. Consequently, the court "regretfully came
to the conclusion that the burden on the appellant to show
that 'publication of the article in question is justified as being
for the public good' had not been discharged."' '
After the decision of the Inner London Quarter Sessions
Court, a revised edition of the Schoolbook, which had been
prepared before the decision, was published. This edition soft-
ened some of the criticized passages and eliminated others;
however, some remained the same. Distribution of the revised
edition was not prosecuted.
In his application lodged with the commission, Mr.
Handyside asserted violation of a number of the articles of the
163 Id. at 11.
I4 Id. at 12.
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convention, but the commission declared the application ad-
missible only with respect to article 10 and article 1 of proto-
col 1. The latter provides: "Every natural or legal person is
entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one
shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public inter-
est and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by
the general principles of international law." 168 In its report of
September 30, 1975, the commission expressed the opinion, by
eight votes to five, that there had been no violation of article
10 and by nine votes to four, no violation of article 1 of proto-
col 1.166
Nevertheless, the judgment of the European Court was
unanimous, except for a very limited dissent by Judge Mosler.
With respect to morals, the court was inclined to afford the
domestic authorities a generous "margin of appreciation." It
also attached particular importance to the intended reader-
ship of the schoolbook, saying:
It was aimed above all at children and adolescents aged
from about twelve to eighteen. Being direct, factual and re-
duced to essentials in style, it was easily within the compre-
hension of even the youngest of readers. The applicant had
made it clear that he planned a widespread circulation. He
had sent the book, with a press release, to numerous daily
papers and periodicals for review for advertising purposes.
What is more, he had set a modest sales price (thirty pence),
arranged for a reprint of 50,000 copies shortly after the first
impression of 20,000 and chosen a title suggesting that the
work was some kind of handbook for use in school.1 67
Obviously, the applicant sought to present a different pic-
ture. He argued that the obscenity prosecution was a pretext
and that the real reason for the prosecution was political in
nature.16 The European Court responded to this argument by
105 EUR. CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS art. 1, protocol 1.
106 The vote on article 10 was actually closer: two additional dissents were later
recorded. REPORT OF THE EUR. COMM. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, Application No. 5493/72,
Richard Handyside v. United Kingdom, 3 n.1 (1975).
1" Handyside, supra note 77, at 18-19.
188 Id. at 19. He maintained that the "demands of the protection of morals" and
the "war against publication likely to 'deprave and corrupt'" were specious argu-
ments. He said:
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stating:
For its part the Court finds that the anti-authoritarian
aspects of the Schoolbook as such were not held in the judg-
ment of 29 October 1971 to fall foul of the 1959/1964 Acts.
Those aspects were taken into account only insofar as the
appeal court considered that, by undermining the moderat-
ing influence of parents, teachers, the Churches and youth
organizations, they aggravated the tendency to "deprave and
corrupt" which in its opinion resulted from other parts of
the work. It should be added that the revised edition was
allowed to circulate freely by the British authorities despite
the fact that the anti-authoritarian passages again appeared
there in full and even, in some cases, in stronger terms ....
As the government noted, this is hard to reconcile with the
theory of a political intrigue.169
There was no dissent from this aspect of the court's opin-
ion. It is interesting to note, however, that several members of
the commission, both in the majority and in the dissent, took
much more seriously than the court the argument that this
was in reality more of a prosecution for subversive advocacy
than for obscenity. For example, three members of the major-
ity stated:
We are prepared to go further than our colleagues form-
ing the majority in this case and assert that the action of the
United Kingdom authorities was justified as a necessary
measure taken in a democratic society in the interest of na-
tional security or public safety within the framework of Arti-
cle 10(2).
The Little Red Schoolbook, although it contains a sec-
tion of some 20 pages on sex, is not a book about sex as
such. It is a book which is, in essence, subversive, tending as
it does to instill into young children an anti-authoritarian
The truth of the matter ... was that an attempt had been made to muzzle
a small-scale publisher whose political leanings met with the disapproval of
a fragment of public opinion. Proceedings were set in motion . . . in an
atmosphere little short of hysteria, stirred up and kept alive by ultra-con-
servative elements. The accent in the judgment of 29 October 1971 on the
anti-authoritarian aspects of the Schoolbook showed... exactly what lay
behind the case ....
169 Id.
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attitude not merely against parent and teacher but also
against the established institutions of the State.
1 7 0
Two members of the dissent also addressed the question
of subversion, but from a different point of view:
What is perhaps the base of opposition to the book is
that it is said to be subversive of parental and school disci-
pline and authority; and this description is directed particu-
larly at those sections which are devoted to conduct and ac-
tivities in school, "We have identified a number of passages
which can fairly be said to encourage challenges to or defi-
ance of the authority of teachers, and perhaps, indirectly, of
parents, though it is curious how little parents are men-
tioned in the book. .. "
It is plain that the book has Maoist inspiration. "Stage
one" as the publisher, grown-ups as "paper tigers," "democ-
racy from below," "clashes of interest," "solidarity and
struggle" are all too familiar. But it is not the ideals, aims or
intentions of the publisher that are at issue under Art. 10.
The issue is whether the actual effects of the book as it
stands on teenagers could be such as to justify its suppres-
sion under one or more of the clauses in Art. 10(2).171
Similarly, three other dissenting members of the commission
commented on this aspect of the controversy.172
In the light of this difference of opinion within the com-
mission on the subversive aspect of the book, it is not surpris-
ing that both the commission and the government of the
United Kingdom chose to defend the conviction only on the
ground that it was "necessary . .. for the protection of
morals," without any reference to any of the other possible
justifications for interference with freedom of expression
170 REPORT OF THE EUR. COzA. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, Application No. 5493/72,
Richard Handyside v. United Kingdom at 43.
171 Id. at 48-49.
172 We do not think that the book's views encourage children to reject the
role of parents and teachers in their lives. There is no evidence that it does
so. Moreover, we find that the views expressed are consistent with the
mainstream educational philosophy, as the Inner London Quarter Session
hearing acknowledged. Education is no longer based on relationships of au-
thority, rigid discipline and fear but on respect, reasonableness and the es-
tablishment of a dialogue between the educator and the pupil.
Id. at 52.
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under article 10(2), such as the "interest of national security,
territorial integrity or public safety [and] the prevention of
disorder or crime. ' 17 3 So viewed, probably the hardest ques-
tion in the case was whether the suppression of this particular
book made any sense in the light of the general standards ap-
parently applied to the distribution of obscene or porno-
graphic publications in England. As the court summarized the
argument of the applicant and the minority of the commission
on this point:
The treatment meted out to the Schoolbook and its
publisher in 1971 was ... all the less "necessary" in that a
host of publications dedicated to hard core pornography and
devoid of intellectual or artistic merit allegedly profit by an
extreme degree of tolerance in the United Kingdom. They
are exposed to the gaze of passers-by and especially of young
people and are said generally to enjoy complete impunity,
the rare criminal prosecutions launched against them prov-
ing... more often than not abortive due to the great liber-
alism of juries. The same was claimed to apply to sex shops
and much public entertainment.
17 4
The court's response to this argument was:
In principle it is not the Court's function to compare
different decisions taken, even in apparently similar circum-
stances, by prosecuting authorities and courts; and it must,
just like the respondent Government, respect the indepen-
dence of the courts. Furthermore and above all, the Court is
not faced with really analogous situations: as the Govern-
ment pointed out, the documents in the file do not show
that the publications and entertainment in question were
aimed, to the same extent as the Schoolbook..., at chil-
dren and adolescents having ready access thereto. 17 5
The partially dissenting opinion of Judge Mosler was
partly related to this point since he suggested that the mea-
sures actually taken by the authorities were not necessary for
the protection of morals because they were so ineffectual.
Only ten percent of the Schoolbook's first impression was
173 See text accompanying note 52 supra for a full statement of article 10.
I" Handyside, supra note 77, at 21.
17 Id.
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taken out of circulation; nothing was done or attempted
against the other ninety percent. Consequently, "the result of
the action taken was the punishment of Mr. Handyside, in ac-
cordance with law, but this result does not by itself justify
measures that were apt to protect the young against the con-
sequences of reading the book.
'1 70
At first blush, it may appear quite difficult to reconcile
the attitude shown by the European Court towards the do-
mestic "margin of appreciation" in Handyside with that ex-
hibited in The Sunday Times case. The idea that there is nat-
urally a greater variety in standards of morality among the
European nations than there is in standards for the mainte-
nance of judicial authority does not seem any more self-evi-
dent to the writer than it did to the dissenters in The Sunday
Times case. There was, however, another difference in the na-
ture of the problem presented. The definition of obscenity
generally has presented a problem that defies intellectual
analysis. In the Handyside case no particular objection was
directed to the statutory definition "such as tend to deprave
or corrupt." Thus the objection had to be directed to the
judgment of the Inner London Quarter Sessions Court in ap-
plying the definition to the particular publication. One is re-
minded of the struggles of the United States Supreme Court
with definitions of obscenity from Roth v. United States177 to
Miller v. California,17 8 which ended with the Court itself ei-
ther viewing movies in the basement of the Supreme Court
building or else entrusting to judge or jury the responsibility
of determining whether "the average person, applying con-
temporary community standards, would find that the work
taken as a whole appeals to the prurient interest."17 9 It is not
surprising that the European Court did not wish to go very far
down either of those roads.
In The Sunday Times case, on the other hand, the court
was presented by the House of Lords with a principle or
group of principles which were subject to challenge and intel-
276 Id. at 28.
177 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
1278 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
179 Id. at 24.
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lectual analysis. The question was whether those principles
were necessary for the maintenance of the authority of the ju-
diciary. The reasons given for believing that they were neces-
sary seemed strained and removed from reality. The Law
Lords themselves assumed that the impartiality of judges
would not be impaired by public debate. Since no jury was
involved, the only immediate effect could be on the parties
themselves. Yet a majority of the House of Lords did not
think that the parties should be protected from public debate
with respect to the morality of their positions. It is safe to
hazard the guess that the parties would be just as subject to
pressure from arguments based on moral grounds as from ar-
guments addressed to the legal issues alone. That left the
principal objection, as expressed by Lord Reid, that open
public debate about the very issues to be determined by the
court would itself breed disrespect for the courts in general.
Yet the proceedings would be public and could be reported.
Anyone sufficiently interested would be free to discuss the is-
sues with others and to form his own opinion. It is hard to see
why similar public discussion would be any more likely to
breed disrespect for the courts or why public discussion after
the litigation is over would be any less likely to breed such
disrespect. Thus, if consideration is limited to the justifica-
tions given by the majority of the House of Lords, the judg-
ment of the European Court seems to be almost inescapable.
Nevertheless, an evaluation of the significance of The
Sunday Times case simply on the basis of a comparison of the
majority position in the House of Lords and the majority posi-
tion in the European Court would be a curiously fore-short-
ened view of the whole affair. This is so, partly because the
broader position taken by two of the Law Lords - that the
parties should not be subjected to the pressures of public de-
bate on either moral or legal issues involved in pending litiga-
tion - might commend itself to some people not impressed
with the reasoning of the majority of the Law Lords. Perhaps
too, the bland assumption of all the English opinions that no
worthy judge would be shaken in his impartiality by public
debate on the issues involved in litigation before him should
not be accepted without reservation. When the evils of trial by
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newspaper as frequently practised on the American scene are
contrasted with the virtues of trial in complete insulation
from public debates as supposedly practised on the British
scene, the concern is not limited to the possible effects on ju-
rors or party litigants.180 The comparative merits of the two
systems, if indeed there still are two systems, are beyond the
scope of this modest exercise. However, one cannot help won-
dering what might emerge from the House of Lords if that
august body were pressed into a full-dress reconsideration of
its whole position on contempt of court and freedom of the
press, in light of the European Human Rights Convention and
the opinions of the European Court of Human Rights. And
finally, what would be the response of the European Court if
it were presented with a coherent restatement of the English
position, not plagued with the internal inconsistencies of The
Sunday Times opinions? Is it too much to hope that a contin-
ued dialogue between the English courts and the European
Commission and Court might eventually produce a happy me-
dium between the American tolerance for "trial by newspa-
per" and the English penchant for trial in splendid isolation?
For example, the English courts might abandon the rather
strained conceptions that the parties, as well as the courts, are
entitled to be free from the pressures of public opinion, and
that public debate about issues pending before a particular
court promotes disrespect for the judicial process in general.
They might also follow to its logical conclusion their own as-
sumption that English judges are substantially immune from
the pressures of public opinion and thus confine their concern
to comments about pending jury trials in criminal cases.81 In
180 For enlightening comparisons of the English and American systems, see the
dissenting or concurring opinions of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Maryland v. Balti-
more Radio Show, Inc., 338 U.S. 912 (1950); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 384
(1947); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 350 (1946); Bridges v. California, 314
U.S. 252, 279 (1941); R. GOLDFARB, THE CONTEMPT POWER 77-100 (1963); Cowen,
Prejudicial Publicity and Fair Trial: A Comparative Examination of American, En-
glish and Commonwealth Law, 41 IND. L.J. 69 (1965); Goodhart, Newspapers and
Contempt of Court in English Law, 48 HARv. L. REv. 885 (1935); Jaffe, Trial by
Newspaper, 40 N.Y.U.L. REv. 504 (1965).
181 This is substantially the position adopted by Lois G. Forer in her 1953 Ross
Prize Essay, A Free Press and a Fair Trial, 39 A.B.A.J. 800 (1953), except that she
would apparently confine "pending" to the time extending from the empanelling of
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short, the fascination of The Sunday Times litigation lies not
so much in elucidation of the law that has been established, as
in the vistas it suggests for further exploration and
development.
the jury to the return of the verdict, and would also permit the press to "draw infer-
ences and make evaluations" based on the evidence introduced. Id. at 846. This is
certainly not the English rule and I doubt that it should be imposed by the European
Court. Instead the ban might well be allowed to run from the time of indictment or
issuance of a warrant until return of the verdict, and press coverage might be re-
stricted to objective reporting during that period.
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